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Since we have all heard from the media that the cold
war is over and there will be peace dividends, why should
there even be any discussion of war let alone the
termination of war and its maritime component? A very
polished current President, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet,
and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) , Mikhail Gorbachev, has given the world a plan
for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the
face of the earth by the year 2000. He told his party a
report that nuclear was is totally unacceptable and cannot
be won, that the preparation for nuclear war cannot bring
political advantage to anyone.
„ For those in the West who did not get the message
through translations, Gorbachev provided his explicit
message in English; going so far as to repudiate
Clausewitz. If this is not enough, the CPSU and government
leadership has repudiated "peaceful coexistence" as simply
another form of the class struggle.
Has the Soviet threat to the U.S. and NATO gone away?
Is the danger of a superpower war so remote today that we
should shift our strategic planning focus to third world and
non-military threats? Do we have an opportunity to terminate
the cold war that the Bolsheviks first started waging in
1917? 3 Perhaps it would be better to terminate this cold
war and assist the former Soviet Union in its transition to
another political state rather than to continue to see the
Soviet threat is former terms and risk needing to plan for
termination of a future hot war.
On the other hand, do events in Eastern Europe cause
alarm in the West and raise the specter of a fragmented
Soviet empire with multiple nuclear actors or a central core
that lashes out from its deathbed? Will events get so out
of hand in the USSR that the West will consider once again
intervening to safeguard war materials, this time strategic
nuclear weapons, so that they will not be used? Once the
breakup of the Soviet empire is complete, will a new strong
central government take its place and will this one be just
as great a threat to the West as the past one?
These guestions cause us to first consider the category
of war termination as a legitimate area for research. The
danger of war still exists, although the type of war that we
have all considered the old main line possible future war
scenario is probably not nearly as of much interest today as
it was even a few months ago. This paper will first attempt
to look at the types and nature of war itself first before
attempting to define its maritime components and the role
that the sea services play in war termination.
THE NATURE OF WAR
Since the focus of this research is war termination
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and since
there is a general lack of standardization of military terms
in the West, it seems appropriate to use the well thought
out and standardized Soviet terms for the purposes of making
explicit any discussion of what types of wars are being
discussed. This effort will also aid us in identifying
differences in strategic culture.
The nature of a future war can be ascertained by the
study of a the high level political-military aspects of
governmental policy. This area of knowledge is termed the
military doctrine of a nation. The military doctrine of a
nation can be separated into two basic components: first the
sociopolitical aspects which are basically the theory of war
encompassing methodological, economic, social and legal
principles. These first sociopolitical aspects are
relatively constant over an extended period of time.
Recently, the sociopolitical aspects of a revised
"defensive" Warsaw Pact military doctrine have been
published and widely discussed in the Soviet literature.
Under the sociopolitical aspects of Soviet military
doctrine, we find official pronouncements that the USSR and
the Warsaw Pact have renounced the use of war to settle any
political, economic and ideological differences. The Warsaw
Pact nations "... have committed themselves to not begin
military operations (voyennyye deystviya) against any
state. . . " except in response to an attack. The Soviets
have also renounced first nuclear strikes and made claims
that generally, nuclear war or even the use of a single
nuclear weapon cannot achieve any political gains.
The second of the two basic components of military
doctrine are the military-technical aspects or the practice
of war, encompassing organizational development, technical
eguipment, training, and determinations of the forms and
mode of the conduct of operations and war. "This aspect of
doctrine defines the ways, means and methods of
accomplishing tasks pertaining to reliable defense of the
socialist homeland, tasks assigned to the Armed Forces by
this country's political leaders." The military-technical
aspects of doctrine deals primarily with the character of
the threat, the preparation of the nation for specific types
of wars, the types of armed forces reguired, and the types
of armed conflict (missions) which the armed forces must be
prepared to conduct. 8
Having published the new sociopolitical tenets of its
military doctrine, the Soviet Union is currently undergoing
a thorough discussion of its military-technical aspects.
Unlike debates over doctrine in the past, the present
discussion is occurring, in part, in the open. The
discussion will effect the reformulation of Soviet military
art, strategy, operational art, and tactics. In order to
understand these aspects and the follow-on questions of war
termination and its maritime aspects, we first must consider
the nature of war as it is understood by the Soviets.
Perhaps the most important distinction made in the USSR
over the use of the term "war" is that the Soviet military
does not limit their analysis of war to merely the armed
conflict portion. There is a recognition that war consists
of the economic struggle, diplomatic activities, ideological
efforts, intelligence undertakings, competition in the
scientific and technical areas, as well as the armed
conflict conducted by armed forces. These distinctions,
however, are often ignored by spokesmen outside of the
military who often use the word "war" with the same meanings
as it has in the West.
Just as the Soviets have categorized all aspects of
military doctrine, they have also describe the varying
characteristics and classes of wars itself. According to
the Soviets, wars also may be characterized by a number of
sociopolitical and military-technical features. The socio-
political aspects of war include a number of economic and
sociopolitical issues with the primary characterization of
wars as either just or unjust. Just wars are "waged in the
name freedom and progress, in defense of national
independence, against aggression." Unjust wars are "waged
for purposes of plunder, conquest, enslavement, and defense
of reactionary regimes."
In order to understand what character and classes of
war the current President/General Secretary of the CPSU and
the Soviet military have now stated they are against or have
renounced (in order to study termination) , we need to
consider these sociopolitical characterizations and classes
of war.
' The first sociopolitical characteristic or class of war
is a war in defense of the homeland. For the socialist
states, there is an additional and special subcategory
termed wars in defense of the socialist homeland. Wars are
in defense of national independence are always just wars.
Wars in defense of the socialist homeland are enshrined in
the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR. Such wars
are central to an understanding of the character and classes
of wars that have been and have not been renounced by the
current leadership of the CPSU and Soviet government. There
has been a steady stream of comments in the literature
reinforcing this type of war.
In the final analysis, preparation for wars in defense
of the homeland are the objective raison d'etre for all
national armed forces. Even if the CPSU ceases to be the
guiding force in the USSR, or even if the USSR breaks up
into multiple political actors, there will always be a
requirement for the defense of the homeland. There will
always be agencies in any Soviet or Russian government that
warn of an impending attack by external forces or warn of a
resurgent Germany. As such there remains a need to study how
wars in defense of the homeland are terminated and the role
of maritime sector in such efforts.
The second sociopolitical characteristic or class of
war" is a revolutionary or civil war fought against
oppression and for the purposes of liberation from
exploitation. Revolutionary or civil wars are always just
wars if fought against the forces of reaction. The third
sociopolitical characteristic or classification of war is
wars of national liberation. Such wars if conducted against
reactionary or imperialistic forces are always just wars.
Wars of national liberation advance the cause of freedom and
social progress.
In the past, it was clear that officially according to
ideological dogma, peace was impossible until the source of
war, imperialism, had been eliminated and society had been
transformed. With the realization that Marx and Engels are
either no longer speaking to Mikhail Gorbachev or if they
are, it no longer matters what they say, the
internationalist mission of the Soviet Armed Forces is
changing. This will have a significant impact on the force
structure and probably the character of the Soviet Navy.
In the early 1970s, some in the West went so far as to
suggest that the Soviet Navy was being built specifically to
support its internationalist mission. If there was ever
any truth to this argument, with the death of evangelical
international socialism, the structure of the Soviet Navy
and other maritime assets will change (presumably reduction
in capability), hence effecting the Navy's ability to
support war termination of major wars between the
superpowers
.
The subject of termination of wars of national
liberation or civil wars remains a legitimate area for
research, although outside the major area of concern in this
effort other than their possible effect on the ability to
fight and terminate a war in defense of the homeland. The
decline in interest in such foreign wars by the CPSU
leadership will have a direct impact on the size and
capability of Soviet maritime forces which will have an
impact on the termination of wars in defense of the
homeland.
The fourth major sociopolitical characteristic or
classification for wars is wars of imperialism. Such wars
are rarely just wars according to the Soviets. These types
of wars would include suppression of just struggles for
liberation, the capture of foreign territory,
enslaving/plundering other peoples, defense by reactionary
regimes, any war against socialist states, and most wars
between capitalist nations. The only just war in this class
would be those aimed at protecting the state sovereignty of
a capitalist country from imperialist aggression. Hence,
even if the most heretofore unlikely events occur in the
Soviet empire, i.e. socialist states become capitalist
states, a war fought in defense of state sovereignty by this
new nation would be a just war fought in defense of the
homeland.
Despite the rhetoric against war that has been
emanating from Moscow, there has certainly not been any
renouncing of wars in defense of the socialist homeland.
Since the Soviets still feel that there is a danger of war,
a discussion of future possible wars between the superpowers
fought under the rubric of a war in defense of the homeland,
even if not a socialist homeland, and even certain other
types of just wars, and therefore a discussion of war
termination is therefore still warranted after consideration
of the sociopolitical characteristics or classes of wars.
In addition to the above four major sociopolitical
characteristics and classes of war, there are also a five
military-technical characteristics and classes of war. The
first military-technical characteristic or classification of
war is its scope and scale. Wars are either local or world
wide. The Soviet military feels that any future war with
the United States would automatically be a global war.
In the West and within the Soviet academic literature,
there are differences in opinion over this issue with some
advocating the confinement of war to the theater of origin
whiie others argue over the inability to do this. In the
maritime sector it is very difficult to image that armed
conflict could be raging in one theater while in another,
the belligerents render honors when passing each other on
the high sea. There are guestions also over the
desirability of horizontal escalation from theaters where
one is currently at a disadvantage to theaters where one has
an advantage.
10
The scope and scale of a war have obvious implications
for the termination of a war. Questions arise over whether
or not combat can be limited to a single theater, whether or
not certain categories of weapons, such as nuclear, will be
used (first or last) at sea or whether their use is tied to
use ashore, of whether or not victory at sea is necessary at
all to either superpower?
The second major military-technical characteristic or
classification of war is by the makeup of the belligerents,
i.e. the war is either between coalitions or simply between
two belligerents. Despite the events in Eastern Europe
today, it is likely that any war planning that is going on
in either the Kremlin or the Pentagon still assumes that for
the opposing side, NATO and the Warsaw Pact might function
at least to some degree. The Soviet literature has
traditionally assumed that a future war with the U.S. would
be a war between coalitions.
Those of us interested in war termination should also
consider, however, future wars only between the two
superpowers with other nations (including nuclear powers)
having a significant interest but no direct military role
Indeed, perhaps the termination of a major war by the two
superpowers alone should have been a planning option all
along. For example, although such a war would reguire a
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surviving strategic nuclear reserve for use the other
superpower, there will also be a reguirement for residual
reserve forces to balance the offensive and defensive forces
of the other nuclear and nonnuclear powers that might pose a
threat at the end of the war.
A third major military-technical characterization or
class of war is based upon the military hardware employed.
The Soviet theoretical differentiation in this area is that
wars either make use of conventional forces or employ
weapons of mass destruction including a nuclear and nuclear
missile war. Although at the outset, it would seem that
these distinctions are fairly neat, the division of war into
these two classes is actually guite complicated.
Despite the pronouncements of the CPSU and military
leadership that nuclear war can serve no political purpose,
war 1* and nuclear war are still possible, there have been
numerous discussions in the literature over the dangers that
still exist, accidental nuclear wars, or escalation out of a
crisis.
The recent Soviet repudiation of nuclear war by the
Soviet political leadership does not exactly fit into the
traditional classes of war as outlined by the Soviet
military. It appears what the Soviet political leadership
has actually renounced is nuclear-rocket war on a scale that
12
would equate to a world war. Although senior military
spokesmen have also renounced world nuclear-rocket war,
there is also a clear recognition by all Soviet spokesmen
that as long as nuclear weapons exist, they serve a
politically useful purpose in the deterrence of war (all
types but especially a nuclear-rocket war) and to prevent
political coercion against the USSR and socialist nations of
the world.
In 1987, three Soviet academics wrote that nuclear
armed conflict itself does have direct political utility. 15
There also have been statements by senior military
strategists, both before and after the current
President/General Secretary of the CPSU came out against
nuclear war, that a nuclear war can in fact still serve
political purposes. ° In a 1988 article released in
English, two academics first make reference to the Gorbachev
party line against the political utility of nuclear war and
• • • •17then argue against banishing nuclear war from politics.
If nuclear war does not serve any political purpose,
this argument must be taken to its logical extreme that even
a just war in defense of the socialist homeland does not
warrant the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, there have even
been some suggestions of this in the Soviet press. .pa
A long-standing theme in the Soviet military literature
13
is that any nuclear war, however initiated or limited, could
not be kept within bounds and would inevitably escalate
either vertically or horizontally. There has been no
argument over this assumption by the civilian academics or
military. The assumption will therefore be that from the
Soviet perspective, their planning assumption is that any
nuclear use will precipitate additional nuclear use. This
planning assumption, however, does not mean that at the time
of the execution of plans, cooler heads might not prevail.
The maritime aspects of this issue of an expanding
nuclear war have been an area for much discussion. Clearly
the Soviets and other countries have the capability to fight
a nuclear war in the maritime theaters. The United States
position on this issue was made explicitly clear by the
Secretary of Defense when he stated that it is ". . . our
pol'icy objective of denying the Soviets the ability to limit
a nuclear war to the sea." In other words, although the
U.S. might not like to fight a nuclear war at sea, if the
Soviets were to initiate one there, it is American
declaratory strategy to not allow such operations to be
limited to the sea. This has obvious implications for war
termination.
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Although a war might not actually employ the actual use
of nuclear weapons, any war between the superpowers must be
planned with the possibility of their use. In other words,
a military commander developing strategy or plans should
assume that all wars between the superpowers are nuclear
wars, just that it some of them the weapons might not yet
have been used. There have been a number of statements in
the Soviet literature from both the military and civilian
academics to support such a view.
The artificial separation at the policy level of war
into nuclear war (less acceptable) and nonnuclear war (more
acceptable) is a subject that I have addressed elsewhere.
From a maritime perspective, the tactical interrelationship
of these two classes of war can be illustrated by the
advantages to submarines making conventional weapons strikes
against naval surface forces which have been forced to
disperse in the face of an imminent strike from nuclear
22weapons.
Once nuclear weapons have been used, the war does not
necessarily terminate, nor might the conventional armed
conflict end. It is very likely that conventional combat
actions will occur simultaneously with nuclear strikes and
continue on after nuclear actions are over. This is
especially true at sea where a coordinated attack on
15
maritime units might take on the character of an initial
nuclear strike and then mopping up operations using
conventional ordnance. Issues for termination, therefore,
include how to ensure that second nuclear use will not come
easier during these subsequent conventional combat actions
than did the first nuclear use? Indeed, especially at sea,
we need to think how to arrange nuclear cease fires while
the war and armed conflict go on. In other words,
deterrence of the nuclear portion of an armed conflict may
need to occur before the war, during the initial
conventional phase of a war, and even after terminating
initial nuclear use.
Similarly, there is a requirement to deter the
escalation to nuclear war (even accidental or limited
nuclear war) during the period of rising tensions in a
crisis. Both superpowers have used their fleets, including
submarines, for coercive naval diplomacy and it is assumed
that some of these units are nuclear capable. Although it
is difficult to fully create scenarios in which accidental
nuclear strikes might occur on the high seas, attention
should be given to just such a possibility in order that the
termination phase of the crisis will receive appropriate
attention. In late 1989, a suggestion was made by a Soviet
16
general officer to hold joint games with the West to explore
the process of de-escalation.
Whether one chooses prevention, minimal deterrence,
mutual assured destruction, or a combination of the two as
the preferred theory of deterrence, there is general
agreement by all nuclear powers that a nation must have a
survivable/secure nuclear reserve force capable of striking
back, even if subjected to a coordinated, surprise first
strike or actions taken by conventional forces against
nuclear weapons or their delivery systems. This reserve
retaliatory force must be perceived by other nations as
having the credible capability of a retaliatory strike,
generally even after worst case enemy actions. The Soviet
Union accepts, in deed, the deterrence of nuclear war by
having the capability to prevent strikes against its own
homeland and punish an aggressor with a strategic nuclear
reserve (some of it at sea) if such military operations are
unsuccessful
.
The neat distinction of war into nuclear and
conventional is an artificial creation. A more realistic
planning assumption is that at a minimum, the maneuver or
actual use of nuclear missiles/weapons of mass destruction
will be contemplated by at least one superpower in any
future crisis, armed conflict or war between them. This
17
means that the military strategist should assume and plan
that any future superpower crisis, armed conflict, or war
can involve nuclear or nuclear-rocket weapons. One should
also assume that accidental nuclear strikes are possible
either in the period of rising tensions of a crisis or
during the initial conventional stage of an armed conflict or
war.
Therefore the subject of the termination of nuclear war
remains an area that requires research despite public
pronouncements from the highest levels of leadership in both
the U.S. and USSR that a nuclear war must never be fought.
Although war termination generally focuses on nuclear war
termination, there is a clear need to discuss termination of
superpower crises, limited armed conflicts, and wars that
have not yet seen the use of nuclear weapons (but perhaps
the^r maneuver) and have remained at the conventional-only
level.
We ought to also consider the termination of nuclear
crises, armed conflicts, and wars that have reverted to the
use of conventional weapons and the requirements for renewed
nuclear deterrence under the conditions where nuclear
weapons have already been used at least once. If all
superpower crises, armed conflicts, or wars are
automatically potentially nuclear wars, perhaps one of the
18
more interesting questions to research is whether or not a
crises, armed conflicts, or wars occurring under the threat
of or with actual nuclear use can actually be terminated
prior to the expending of all of the nuclear "bullets?"
Research into the termination of nuclear wars must also
continue as a hedge against the possibility that current
Soviet arms control efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons by
the year 2000 will be unsuccessful.
The fourth major military-technical characteristic and
classification used to describe wars is pace. Whether a war
is fast moving or prolonged is somewhat related to the other
three previous characteristics. It is usual for the Soviets
to break a war into periods (termed the "periodization" of a
war) no matter what length there is to the war itself. In
historical analysis of past wars, great emphasis is placed
upon the initial period of a war, indeed this term rates an
extremely lengthy entry in the Soviet Military
Encyclopedia
.
A cursory review of recent Soviet military journals
reveals a great deal of interest in the initial period of
the Great Patriotic War, when the Soviet Armed Forces
struggled on the strategic defensive. In the periodization
of a war, there always appears to be a turning point or
breakthrough period in which the initial defensive
19
operations were replaced by the counteroffensive and finally
the strategic offensive. What is conspicuously absent is
any Soviet analysis of the retaining of strategic-level
reserve military force used for coercion in the negotiations
at the war's termination; a freguent assumption of the role
of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. °
Instead, strategic reserves are generally discussed
from the perspective of formations, units, troops, or
stockpiles of material directly subordinate to the Supreme
High Command that are used at the strategic level of armed
combat (either defensive or offensive) to crush or rout the
enemy, i.e. impact the armed conflict portion of the war and
not its political or diplomatic efforts.
War termination has been thought, by some, to
automatically follow the initial use of nuclear weapons. It
has
)(
been only recently that extended research has gone on
regarding extended nuclear war. Despite the obvious
unpopularity in certain circles over even a discussion of an
extended nuclear war, we must break free of the mentality
that pictures such a war as merely a mindless "spasm" and
recognizes that armed conflict with nuclear weapons would
have the character of other military campaigns, operations,
or strikes.
20
Nuclear weapons delivery vehicles have obvious reload
capabilities. It would seem obvious that nations would and
should take actions, not necessarily nuclear combat actions,
to preclude reconstitution of a nuclear striking force once
its initial ordnance is expended. Operations in the
maritime sector will have special requirements and
opportunities in this regard.
It would also seem that more research is needed in the
extended nature of war (not merely armed conflict) , since we
appear to finally now be able to fully terminate World War
II, some forty-five years after the end of the armed and
economic conflict portion of the war. We must recognize
that the armed conflict portion of war is but one of many
tools available to governments in the settling of their
disputes and the conduct of war. Perhaps this
reconsideration of all of the aspects of war will aid in a
recognition of the importance of war's time element.
The fifth major military-technical characteristic or
classification of wars is whether or not they are wars of
position or wars of maneuver. To a large degree, this
characteristic results from the previous four. Although one
might assume that wars of position have become passe, the
effect of strategic defenses on military campaigns (lack of
21
extended deterrence) might just be to render wars of
mobility less attractive.
Maritime war is automatically a war of mobility. The
extended mobility of fleets enables them to temporarily mass
otherwise widely dispersed assets in order to concentrate
fire for a successful combat strike or battle. Mobility
also allows fleets to change rapidly from defensive to
offensive formations. On the other hand, natural geographic
features can strongly suggest positional behavior by fleets,
such as barriers between islands or the mainland and
islands. 28
With so much of the earth covered by water, maritime
warfare is pursued in an environment where the surface
provides few opportunities for concealment; hence deception
is more difficult to achieve. With better knowledge of the
ocean's floors, we may find that the naval operational
planner will study the terrain of his battlefield much like
his land-oriented counterpart. This may give rise to
reconsideration of certain aspects of subsurface warfare
being more warfare of position than mobility.
22
Figure 1 attempts to graphically display the varying
military-technical characteristics or classifications of
war. These characteristics or classes are in addition to































































MILITARY-TECHNICAL CHARACTER/CLASSIFICATION OF WAR
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Having considered the varying military-technical
characteristics or classes of wars, it is apparent that war
and therefore war termination remains an area that warrants
research despite the pronouncements of political leaders
against fighting either a nuclear and conventional armed
conflict.
With the acceptance that wars are still possible (at a
minimum, the Soviet Union would have no choice but to fight
a war in defense of the homeland) , we now must turn to the
possibility that such wars would be fought to by the
military from the perspective of winning, losing, or
stalemate. Despite repeated pronouncements by the highest
political leadership of the U.S. and USSR that a nuclear war
should not be fought and cannot be won, if a war in defense
of the socialist (or nonsocialist) homeland were to occur,
the Soviet military is certainly going to consider its
options and recommend to its political masters whatever is
possible (including total and partial victory)
.
One of those options, and one that we can safely
predict that any military would investigate and recommend,
if it is possible, is to win the war (or at least not lose
it) at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels. If
the potential is there for an offensive (even if there were
sincere prewar doctrinal statements that the war would be
24
conducted from strictly a defensive perspective) then we
should expect consideration of this option during the war.
Despite what any political leadership says before a war,
once they are in it, they must and will consider all known
options. Indeed, the Soviets recognize that once a war
breaks out, the essential sociopolitical aspects of war
2 q(currently defensive) may change.
The Soviet literature evidence of discussions over the
possibility of winning a nuclear war may have simply been a
reguirement for military analysts to investigate whether or
not such a goal were attainable rather than a specified goal
in actual war plans. Victory has at least been contemplated
and judged as attainable (or not) in the different and
specific sociopolitical and military-technical classes of
war and also at varying levels (strategic, operational, or
tactical) of warfare and armed conflict. The Soviets appear
to be ruling out, for planning purposes, victory in a
nuclear-rocket world war .
Victory may not be possible in an overall war effort,
but victory at the tactical or even the operational level of
the armed conflict may be a necessity if the nuclear-rocket
world war is to be prevented. Therefore victory at the
lower level may be necessary to ensure that a crisis or the
conventional phase of armed conflict does not escalate.
25
In June 1988, one of the more interesting recent Soviet
political-military articles examined how the new defensive
military doctrine would transform the military-technical
side of doctrine at each of these levels of warfare and
armed conflict. The authors of this article outlined the
general nature of combat actions to be taken at each of
these three levels of war and armed conflict for four
possible variants or scenarios of defense of the homeland.
The third variant requires the defender allow the
attacker to wear himself out until such time as the defender
can mobilize his forces for the counteroffensive. The
defender, however, will only have the combat potential for a
counteroffensive that will stop at the borders. In such a
situation, "the concept of victory is also allowed only at
the operational and tactical levels, but is excluded at the
strategic level." Historical antecedents include the Soviet
offensive operation lead by then-General Grigori K. Zhukov
against the Japanese on the Khalkhin Gol (River) in August
1939 and the fourth stage (July 10, 1951 - July 27 1953) of
the war in Korea when both sides exercised restraint even
though they might have gone on the offensive and crossed the
armistice line.
Andrei Kokoshin, Deputy Director of the Institute of the
USA and Canada and one of the authors of this article,
26
mentioned later "there is now a real possibility that the
USSR will adopt the third model as its goal." 32 Additional
discussions of future security scenarios have been advanced
by an outspoken academic from the Institute of World
Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of
Sciences, Alexi G. Arbatov. In a widely discussed article,
Arbatov stated "We declare officially that a protracted
large-scale conventional war with NATO in Europe is
impossible and unacceptable" and that "it is very hard to
imagine" a "conventional war between the Soviet Union and
the United States. . ." Further more, for planning
purposes, the Soviet military should conduct only defensive
operations, and should not assume a simultaneous two front
33war. JJ
WAR, TERMINATION DECLARATORY STATEMENTS
The debate over the future security environment expected
is not quite completed. Political guidance to military
doctrine in the USSR has changed from previous years. Which
side wins in this debate can be immaterial to a discussion
of the problems of current war termination, except to give
us guidance an current thinking. If a war were to be fought
today, however, it is likely that the military leadership
27
would retain their "old thinking" from the days that they
were first socialized into the Army.
The Soviet military and civilian academics who have
entered the debate appear to be wrestling with how to
implement their new planning guidance and have given us some
clues on their perception of the requirements for war
termination with a clear bias towards early termination —
prior to escalation of any type. Andrei Kokoshin, one of
the authors of the four variants article, told a Western
audience in late 1989 that the basic mission for the Soviet
Armed Forces should be to restore the status quo without
violating the territory of the other side and without
counterattacking beyond the operational and
operational/tactical level.
A Soviet general officer wrote in late 1989 about the
possible ways that armed conflict can be ended; laying out
four potential scenarios and suggesting that war and crisis
termination be the subject for additional research (the
attacker surrenders as a result of counterattacks, the
attackers achieves his objective and sues for peace, the
attacker temporarily stops while regrouping for a new
attack, and the attacker stops without giving the defender
any indication of his intentions). 36
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In a November 1989 interview, Marshal of the Soviet
Union Sergei F. Akhromeyev, military advisor to the current
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, stated some very specific
views on crises or war termination implying that the role of
the defensive, during the initial period of a future war,
was to allow the political leadership the opportunity to
terminate it. Failing that, the military would be unleased
to perform their normal function of crushing and decisively
-j 7
routing the enemy.
It appears that the traditional strategic missions of
the Soviet Armed Forces and the criteria for successful
completion of those missions has undergone significant
revision. In the past, total defeat was reguired of the
enemy's armed forces in armed conflict as the military's
contribution to overall war termination. Under the new
defensive doctrine, the revised military requirement is to
defeat the invading force and to prevent vertical and
horizontal escalation or the escalation of the conflict over
time. If necessary, the military might have to respond with
additional options that might not be foreseen prior to the
war. The political/ideological goal of traditional Soviet
war termination strategy was to ensure that the aggressor
would not be in a position to once again threaten the USSR
and that progress was made toward eventual peace ("mir") and
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a world socialist order. It appears that the political
goals for war termination are now to prevent nuclear
holocaust and simultaneously ensure the survival of the
homeland (socialist or other)
.
STRATEGIC MISSIONS IN WAR
In analyzing what drives Soviet military doctrine, or
indeed the military doctrine of any state, we find that in
the USSR it is the military policy of the CPSU (or in other
states it is simply military policy) . According to Soviet
authors, the words used to describe the defensive
capability of a state is determined by the same words
(termed factors of war) used in issues considered by
military policy. These are the military or combat potential
of a state, its economic potential (military-economic
potential is a subset) , scientific potential (again
military-scientific potential is a subset) , social
potential, and finally moral-political potential. Further
investigation reveals that these same words are used to
describe what decides the course and outcome of war and what
is necessary for victory at the strategic level.
During the armed conflict portion of a war, the Soviet
Armed Forces would have the opportunity to undermine with
new means, the military/combat, military-economic, social,
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and moral-political potential of their enemy, thus having a
great influence on the course and outcome of war and the
attainment of victory at the strategic level.
During the pre-armed conflict portion of war or during
the war itself, the government of a state has the
opportunity to build up one's own potentials in each of
these areas and to undermine those of the enemy using
legitimate or illegitimate economic, diplomatic,
ideological, intelligence, or scientific and tools.
These factors of war are clearly identified in the
appropriate Soviet scientific reference publications and are
used widely in military-political writings. It is important
to recognize that these factors offer us the possibility of
bridging the gap from a discussion of war and its goals into
specific military (strategic level) and combat (operational
and„ tactical levels) operations/actions that must be
undertaken to undermine an enemy's overall potential and
therefore attain victory at each level. It is possible to
identify the level of warfare or armed conflict which would
be effected by tying the military or combat (including
naval) operations/actions to the goal to be attained. In
the Soviet literature, one can clearly see not only the use
of these terms in setting the reguirements for a healthy
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defense of the USSR but in also identifying targets for
strikes against enemies in time of war.
The major strategic goals and strategic missions of the
Soviet Armed Forces in an armed conflict have been openly
discussed in the Soviet military literature for numerous
years. Figure 2 attempts to illustrate the traditional
military operations at the strategic level of armed conflict
and the assigned role of maritime forces.
There is some Soviet Navy literature evidence, however,
that these traditional strategic missions have been revised
in accordance with the new defensive military doctrine of
the socialist community and the USSR. Figure 3 attempts
to formulate these new missions and place the Soviet Navy
within them.
Analysis of either Figure 2 or 3 is a useful starting
place to move from politically determined goals in a war or
armed conflict to major military missions in order to
understand how each Soviet armed service will be used. Both
Figures 2 and 3 show the connection from military
operations/actions at the strategic level of armed conflict
to the combat operations/actions at the operational and
tactical levels. Original Russian words are contained in
parentheses where appropriate to ensure that the reader can
correctly place key phrases in this diagram.
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TRADITIONAL SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGIC MISSIONS
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POSSIBLE NEW SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGIC MISSIONS
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The Soviet Navy's strategic role in a modern war
between the superpowers, where operations were assumed to be
global, relatively brief, and perhaps nuclear, had been
thought to be generally limited to threatening nuclear
missile strikes from protected bastions. Protecting the
bastions would take up a major portion of the Soviet surface
and subsurface fleet operating in an active defensive role.
Another important strategic mission for the Soviet Navy has
traditionally been to assist the Soviet Ground forces in the
conduct of the theater strategic operation ashore.
Recently the Soviet Navy was given an increased role in
defense of the nation from enemy strikes from the sea, a
role that they share with the Soviet Air Defense Troops. As
to distant water military operations on the high seas, this
has been a long-term and basically unfunded goal due to a
lack of appreciation for navies by the leadership of the
Soviet Armed Forces and CPSU.
One can therefore view the Navy's discussion of these
new strategic missions as their attempt to revise the
general lack of appreciation for the maritime sector by the
marshals and generals and to once again explain how maritime
forces can be used to achieve political goals during an
armed conflict. This obviously has an impact on the use of
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maritime forces at the strategic level of armed conflict and
therefore in war termination.
Instead of using historical and Western surrogates as
did the late Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei
G. Gorshkov when he served as Commander in Chief of the
Soviet Navy in his many writings, we now see explicit
examples how a strong Soviet Navy can meet the new
reguirements for a defensive doctrine. What is not clear,
however, is whether or not the Navy's position has been
accepted by the marshals and generals.
Under the new defensive doctrine, the Soviet Navy
argues that it has an even more important role than it did
in the past. Most of the world's navies argue this point
and most analysts of the Soviet Navy do the same. What is
important is to look for evidence that the role of the fleet
has" increased at the expense of some other service.
Generally such evidence is lacking.
We see the major mission of defense of the homeland
includes strategic antisubmarine and surface warfare naval
operations. Both are designed to eliminate the source of
missiles and aircraft that could be used to strike the USSR.
These operations as well as direct defense of the homeland
are not new and have always existed under this category.
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They are obvious missions to be fought in a war in defense
of the homeland.
If initial defensive military operations of several
weeks were not successful and the political leadership could
not contain the conflict, the USSR would then "develop their
armed forces in accordance with their plans for wartime." 42
Under such a scenario, we would expect to see the Soviet
Navy play a strategic role in the suppression of the enemy's
military-economic potential and the destruction of groupings
of enemy armed forces.
The suppression of the enemy's military economic
potential is still undertaken by strikes including those
from Soviet naval ballistic missile submarines. What is new
under the Navy's publication of possible new strategic
missions for the Soviet Armed Forces, however, is the
shifting of attacks against the enemy sea lines of
communication from a separate category (which had always
been criticized as being unable to have an effect on the
outcome of war) to being an integral part of the major
strategic mission of undermining the enemy military-economic
potential. This implies that the sea lines of communication
mission may have more importance in the Soviet mind than is
generally conceded in the West.
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If the Soviet Ground Forces are going to be limited to
a defensive capability as prescribed in variant 3, then it
is entirely possible that a very offensive and aggressive
Soviet Navy will be reguired to ensure that any land invaders
cannot be reinformed or resupplied by sea in a long war. We
should recall the military-technical characteristics of war
include its pace; hence there will be a reguirement for the
conducting of both short and long wars, although there may
be funding shortfalls for the more expensive long war.
If we see the Soviets failing to make unilateral
cutbacks in naval forces as they have done in their Ground
Forces, one should not use this as proof of a "real"
offensive Soviet military doctrine. It is instructive to
consider the real offensive capabilities of the U.S. Navy
and the U.S. Air Force which are nested within a real
defensive doctrine in which U.S. and NATO ground forces are
already in conformance with variant 3, i.e. they do not have
the capability to repel an invasion and then invade the USSR
at the level of a theater strategic offensive operation.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MARITIME
THEATERS
Naval leaders like to argue that naval warfare is
either unigue or at least so fundamentally different that
navies should not be commanded by officers who have not
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spent their military careers at sea. Although we see this
argument made often, that does not necessarily mean that
naval warfare is unigue and that the general principles and
laws of war and armed conflict do not apply. Indeed, this
paper has consciously attempted to use the terms generally
applied to land warfare to describe war at sea. There are,
however, many special considerations for military operations
in maritime sectors that should be understood by the vast
majority of people who have their primary experience in land
theaters.
The Soviet Union may choose to deploy its strategic
missile-carrying submarines in restricted waters, so for
geographic, military, political, and legal reasons, other
nations would find it more difficult to conduct offensive
antisubmarine warfare operations including those in support
of war termination. For example, internal waters of a
nation are the legal eguivalent of land and an attack by a
belligerent in such waters would be a definite escalatory
step just as would an attack on the land portion of the
homeland. Attack on the Pacific Fleet in internal waters of
the U.S. by the Japanese in 1941 had a more dramatic effect
than if the attack occurred while the fleet was forward
deployed.
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A recent Master's Thesis at the Naval Postgraduate
School argues that the Soviet's will move toward "close
aboard bastions" within their 12 n.m. territorial sea.
Territorial waters are not the same thing as internal waters
and not the legal equivalent of land. Attacks on ships in
another nations territorial sea (underway but probably
within sight of land) , however, would be more escalatory
than an attack on that same ship on the high seas and less
escalatory than if the attack took place in port (in
internal waters) . Another theory suggested is that the USSR
intends to hide these units in the territorial — and
perhaps internal — waters of other nations. Deploying
submarines in restricted waters close to shore offers the
Soviet Union opportunities to hide submarines, atone for
deficiencies in submarine and antisubmarine warfare
technology, and concurrently keep all regional targets
covered.
The recently publicized reductions in older Soviet
fleet assets (obsolete ships and "harbor queens") results in
a leaner but meaner navy force structure. If theories
about deployments of ballistic missile submarines closer in
to the USSR are correct, the area of responsibility for sea
control by the Soviet Navy decreases. Decreasing the areas
to be controlled coupled with a more efficient force
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structure can result in an increase in the combat potential
of the Soviet Union, albeit in a reduced area. When
increased combat potential is viewed in relation to Soviet
attempts to reduce the threat from the sea with naval arms
control, we can see that the overall correlation of forces
would improve in favor of the USSR and thereby security
A Q
would be enhanced.
Nations routinely anchor their warships in the
territorial sea (and even in internal waters — ports) of
other nations with full permission. Attacks against naval
forces overtly or covertly deployed in the territorial sea
or internal waters of another nation would certainly present
unique challenges.
There are additional political and legal implications
regarding naval deployments that we can also predict would
certainly affect both Soviet and Western decision-making
during a war. For example, should nations conduct offensive
naval operations in or near enemy/other nation's home waters
during the initial conventional phase of war when the
political leadership of a nation is attempting to terminate
the war without escalation? Should operations be conducted
in an enemy's home waters, in a different theater of
operations during a limited or general war, when actions
thus far were confined to another distant theater?
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These questions become even more interesting if we
consider that some of these Soviet home waters are viewed by
the U.S. as subject to high seas rights of navigation, yet
are now or in the past have been considered in some cases by
Soviet writers, and in a few instances officially, as closed
seas, historic, regional, or territorial bays or seas, or
internal waters. For example, the Sea of Okhotsk has been
referred to by Soviet writers as a "closed sea." Similarly,
some writers have described the Sea of Japan as a "regional
sea" to which access would be unrestricted only in
. A Qpeacetime. Both seas are acknowledged as areas for Soviet
ballistic missile submarine deployments.
Whether or not the Sea of Okhotsk is a "closed sea," or
the Sea of Japan is a "regional sea," or the legal
significance of such statements, it is clear that all
nations attach more importance to areas of the ocean close
to its shores than they do to the high seas. We know that
nations react when other nations sail their warships within
"territorial waters," despite the internationally recognized
right of innocent passage. Nations will very likely react
to attacks within its internal or territorial waters,
closed, historic, regional, or territorial bays or seas in a
different manner than to attack forward-deployed units on
the high seas.
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Nations will similarly react differently if other
state's maritime forces remain in these waters for extended
periods of time or conduct combat therein during wartime.
The abilities of navies to remain in waters close to another
nations shores over extended periods of time during a
crisis, or during the termination phase of war is a special
advantage that again demonstrates that the escalation of war
has a horizontal and time component which can have
significant utility.
These geographic, military, political, and legal
ramifications illustrate the ratchet effect possible through
horizontal escalation at sea. Unigue escalatory steps can be
taken at sea to send clear political signals to other
nations during war termination without resorting (or again
resorting) to vertical escalation and nuclear war.
Horizontal escalation has a number of maritime "rungs" that
must be thoroughly investigated by naval and political
leaders and planners, and understood by those who otherwise
criticize such plans.
There are obvious command and control issues that need
to be thought out by each superpower. If, for example,
strikes against the U.S. homeland are the province of the
highest levels of the CPSU, government, and military, then
the theater and tactical commanders must understand where
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the line is, i.e. where does the United States start at sea
and therefore where do restrictions start to apply. Such
questions take on additional complexity in coalition wars.
Another issue that may involve special considerations
in the maritime sector is that of efforts to demonstrate
positive control over nuclear forces when establishing a
nuclear cease fire. Sea based nuclear forces offer the
leadership of a nation the opportunity to demonstrate
command and control over a force by having it fire a nuclear
weapon at a part of the earth using a trajectory that does
not threaten the other party and where the warhead will
explode harmlessly. The possibility of degraded
communications between the political leadership and units at
sea (usually assumed to be a more demanding measure) will
test and demonstrate the surviving command and control
infrastructure
.
Rules of engagement at sea are a bit more difficult to
handle then ashore and the consequences of poor judgment can
often be more dramatic. There are types of ships at sea that
will simply not know they are actually under attack until
such time as the first weapon explodes and the ship is on
her way to the bottom. Plausible danger facing the commander
of a naval ship results in the "STARK" or "VINCENNES" models
with all of the political and military ramifications that
44
follows.
Escalation should not be viewed as having only a
vertical component leading automatically to global nuclear
war. There are significant military actions including those
taken by navies, that can escalate warfare by expanding the
confrontation to new geographic areas or by extending the
conflict over time. Both, construed as actions taken to
"prevent" enemy victory, or at least to "punish" aggression,
fit well into normal deterrence theory and actions which
could be taken during the termination phase of a war.
CONCLUSIONS
War termination remains a legitimate area for research,
even in these exciting days of a changing threat. The
Soviet Union, or whatever nation-state takes the place of
the USSR, will have no choice but to fight a war in defense
of its independence. The current political and some of the
military leadership have repudiated the direct threat of
invasion to the Soviet Union but they do not think that the
danger of war has been eliminated. An unexpected war
(including a nuclear war) may grow out of a crisis or be the
result of a mistake or accident.
We also should consider terminating with parts of the
Soviet empire as well as the possibility that multiple
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nuclear capable political actors may emerge from current and
future events in the Eastern bloc. This implies that the
West must maintain extremely flexible targeting capabilities
so as to rapidly respond to the changing political climate
in Eastern Europe.
Given the objective necessity to fight a war in defense
of sovereignty, there will always be a political reguirement
to consider fighting such wars to a successful conclusion.
Hence victory at the strategic level is an alternative that
must be investigated if only to understand if it is or is
not possible with the military forces at hand. Armed
conflict must also be studied at the operational and
tactical levels and it is not inconsistent to have
aggressive actions at the tactical (or even operational)
level nested within a defensive doctrine. We must continue
to monitor current Soviet debates over possible new variants
for the conducting of armed conflict other than the
traditional active defense of the past.
The Soviets have not openly said very much about war
termination, but what they say indicates a desire to not
fight a war with the West, but if one were to come, to
terminate it guickly with a combination of initial defensive
military and offensive political actions with a residual
capability to go on the offensive if necessary and then
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fight that war to a decisive rout of the aggressors invading
force. The Soviets view of the class nature of warfare may
end in the near future which would transform their
consideration of war termination from being a sociopolitical
event to a more military-technical problem (as it is viewed
in the West) . Soviet war termination goals under the new
defensive doctrine approximate those currently assumed for
NATO, i.e. status guo ante bellum.
War termination must consciously address more than the
armed conflict portion of the war effort. If we expect our
intelligence assets to verify compliance with any
termination agreement, we must end the non-armed conflict
portion of the war as well. In doing so, however, if we
anticipate a shift to a long-term but non-violent
competition with the adversary, then we should terminate the
economic, diplomatic, and other aspects of the war on as
favorable terms as possible.
To understand the strategic missions assigned to the
Soviet Armed Forces in war, and thus the goals they are
attempting to reach prior to war termination, we need to
understand the Soviet factors of war. Undermining the
enemy's military/combat, economic (and military-economic),
and moral-political potentials can be the direct result of
military operations/actions taken at the strategic level
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during armed conflict. Undermining the scientific and
social potential of one's enemy are goals which can be
worked on during the non-military (period of rising
tensions) portions of a war.
The Soviet military has three basic strategic missions
in an armed conflict: the repelling of enemy aerospace
attack, the suppression of the enemy's military-economic
potential, and the destruction of groupings of enemy armed
forces. The Soviet Navy contributes to the day to day
repelling of nuclear strikes against the homeland by its
fielding of ballistic and cruise missile submarines that are
capable of conducting nuclear missile strikes. This
deterrence mission will continue as long as there are
nuclear weapons and would be a requirement during the period
of rising tensions of a crisis and the conventional phase of
an actual war.
The nature of nuclear war must be taken seriously and
investigated as best we can given the limitations of the
social and hard sciences to predict. The start of nuclear
operations in an armed conflict will not be the end of
politics. The political aim may simply becomes to terminate
the war at any cost. Someone, and this is the
responsibility of both the military and political leadership
of a nation, has to think through what combination of
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nuclear and nonnuclear actions would be undertaken to make
this offer credible and to successfully execute it.
Maintaining a strong conventional war fighting
capability at sea is a good idea because it allows you to
have nonnuclear options and the capability to use military
force after first nuclear use, signaling a willingness to
deescalate but still make a political statement and
simultaneously return the conflict to a lower level.
Allowing a conventional campaign against strategic
forces is adding a major rung in the escalation "ladder 11 (as
perceived in the West) and, therefore, raises the nuclear
threshold and does not necessarily upset strategic
stability. It is doubtful that the West could ever procure
sufficient capable forces to mount such a successful
strategic antisubmarine warfare campaign against Soviet
strategic submarines that their wholesale destruction, no
matter how long the war, would be an issue.
In a long war, the strategic mission to battle the
enemy's sea lines of communication takes on a special
importance. Success at sea in such operations would allow
either superpower to be in a better position to terminate
the war on more favorable terms. The destruction of
groupings of enemy naval forces would generally take on the
character of support to the Ground Forces in a combined
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arms/fleet strategic operation in a land theater rather than
a massive strategic level naval operation. The capability
for significant offensive operations on the high seas is
consistent with an overall defensive military doctrine.
Any discussion of military operations/actions taken in
the maritime theaters should also take into consideration
those special circumstances or factors that would be
involved with war at sea. It is not impossible for those
oriented in land warfare to understand such considerations
and it is the responsibility of the navies to ensure that
generals and political leaders can make intelligent
decisions about the strategic employment of the fleet. This
will be especially true in the area of attacks on each
others maritime component of the homeland and termination of
the war at sea.
„
The maritime sector may be the most difficult to
communicate with and therefore command naval forces. In a
war, we should expect major degradation of command and
control making the issuance of new rules of engagement, say
from wartime to peacetime, extraordinarily difficult.
Planning should therefore assume that war termination might
be more ragged in the maritime sector and a clean switch to
more restrictive rules of engagement might be impossible.
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It is clear that Soviet military force structure and
doctrine have changed and military strategy and operational
art are being changed even today. Alarm bells should be
ringing in Washington and in the capitals of Europe against
attempting to negotiate any naval arms control in an era of
such uncertainty over these issues.
War planning, therefore war termination planning, is
different when one is discussing plans for programming and
force acquisition, planning for forces on hand today, and
planning conducted at the time of execution of plans. This
is generally overlooked by civilian academics in both the
U.S. and the USSR who otherwise use programming documents
(posture statements and legislative testimony) as a faulty
surrogate for war planning guidance that is based upon
forces actually in hand.
„ Generally for programming we hold strategies constant
and manipulate force structure, generally proving that the
forces to be procured -- according to contractor
specifications — are necessary to implement the strategy.
The threat is somewhat vague with the programmed force
generally argued as being able to meet all possible
contingencies under the prescribed strategy.
For war planning done by the functional or theater
commanders, the emphasis is on forces on hand with
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manipulation done with strategy. Possible goals are
identified and the forces assigned estimated as being able
to or not accomplish those goals with perhaps some dilution
of expected force capability reflecting actual capabilities
demonstrated in fleet exercises. The enemy threat is
generally specified so as to allow planning to be completed.
Finally, at the time of the execution of plans, we have
to account for actual force capability, as demonstrated in
real combat, (not contractor specifications or exercises)
that survives the first strikes, and the possible strategies
and goals that might be attainable with that capability.
Usually a vastly different threat is now reality and the
reliability of information about that enemy is much less
certain. Planning for programming, war plans, or execution
is therefore very different thus necessitating different
dispussions of termination strategies.
It is important when considering war termination to
understand, whether one is reading documents or talking with
experts, from which of these perspectives war termination is
being addressed. Before a war, we successfully deal with a
great deal of uncertainty about the potential behavior of
foreign nations. For planning purposes, we attempt to be a
bit more precise. When war comes and it is time to be
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terminated, perhaps we can accept grater amounts of
uncertainty than we think.
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